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I. INTRODUCTION
Nora is a forty-three year-old woman diagnosed with bipolar disorder
and moderate mental retardation.' She is a resident of Harmony House, a
group home maintained by a community-based voluntary treatment
program for individuals with mental disabilities. Yesterday, Harmony
House staff called an emergency meeting to address Nora's refusal to take
Thorazine, a psychotropic medication prescribed by the program's
physician to control the symptoms of her disorder. 2 The staff asked Nora
why she refused to take her medication. Nora responded that the
medication made her too sleepy to work.
Dana, a Harmony House staff member, questioned Nora's reason for
refusing her medication. She noted that Nora routinely stays up watching
television until midnight and gets up for work each morning at 5:30 a.m.
Dana speculated that Nora's lack of sleep, and not the Thorazine, was to
blame for Nora's lethargy. Dana reminded Nora in front of the other staff
members that she ought to go to bed by 10:00 p.m. She also noted that the
staff has repeatedly asked Nora to wait until 7:30 a.m. to rise for her job.
Dana's comments angered Nora, who disliked being told what to do. "I
know my rights," Nora shouted. "I can get up when I want to and I don't
have to take my medicine."
1 The situation discussed here is hypothetical and is based on the Author's
experience working with mentally disabled adults. Any similarities to actual persons or
programs are purely coincidental.
2 Thorazine is a major tranquilizer most commonly used to treat patients suffering
from schizophrenia. See 2 MICHAEL L. PEuN, MENTAL DIsABnIxrY LAW: CivIL &
CRIuMNAL § 5.02, at 218 n.5 (1989) (citing G.E. Crane, Two Decades of
Psychopharmacology and Community Mental Health: Old and New Problems of the
Schizophrenic Patient, 36 TRANSACTIONS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 644, 656 (1974); H.C.
Denber, Tranquilizers in Psychiatry, in COMREHENsIvE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
1251 (A.M. Freedman & H.I. Kaplan eds., 1st ed. 1967)). Thorazine is prescribed for
"the management of manifestations of psychotic disorders" in doses large enough to
control the patient's symptoms for a "reasonable period." PHYSICIANS' DESK
REFERENCE 2701, 2703 (1997). For a concise introduction to psychotropic drugs, see
BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 62-63 (1997).
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The staff attempted to calm Nora down but feared that her disorder
would prevent any further attempts at reasonable conversation. This open
condescension frustrated Nora, who abruptly stormed out of the meeting.
Twenty-four hours have now passed with no discussion between Nora
and Harmony House staff. The director of the program worries about what
to do. As a voluntary program, Harmony House cannot force Nora to take
her medication. 3 On the other hand, Harmony House cannot allow Nora's
behavior to disrupt the entire house either.
Currently, programs like Harmony House have two options to resolve
the dispute. They may discharge noncompliant consumers like Nora,
leaving their care to other community agencies or family and friends. 4 Or
they may seek to have the consumers involuntarily committed to a state
psychiatric hospital in order to force them back on their medication. 5
Neither of these options, however, provides a meaningful, long-term
solution. This is because discharge and involuntary commitment only
address who should be responsible for seeing that Nora is taken care of.
They do not address why Nora refuses to take Thorazine, why the staff
3 See Ronald J. Diamond, Coercion and Tenacious Treatment in the Community:
Applications to the Real World, in COERCON AND AGGREssrvE COMMUNITY
TREATMENT: A NEw FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW 51, 61 (Deborah L. Dennis &
John Monahan eds., 1996). Diamond notes, however, that community treatment
programs have other practical means of controlling consumer behavior. This includes
program ability to limit money available to consumers whose funds are managed by
program staff and control over housing through group home arrangements. See id. at
55-58.
4 See id. at 56.
5 See id. at 62. Diamond notes, however, that:
Coercion is often a short-term solution to a long-term problem. ... Most
episodes involving coercion involve clients with a chronic illness. [However,]
[tihese clients require an ongoing rather than an episodic approach to
treatment... [rather than a more immediate one which focuses on getting] the
client to take the medication as soon as possible.
Id. Other scholars agree. "Coercion may sometimes be necessary, particularly in the
treatment of severely ill patients. However, in light of the potential antitherapeutic
consequences of coercion, clinicians should resort to it only when truly necessary and
should involve the patient in the ... treatment decision-making processes to the greatest
extent possible." Bruce J. Winick, Coercion and Mental Health Treatment, 74 DENy.
U. L. REv. 1145, 1167 (1997). For a more complete discussion of the impact of
involuntary medication on individuals with mental illnesses, see Harold I. Schwartz et
al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Patients' Attitudes After Involuntary
Medication, in THERAPEUIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A TimPamc AGENT 189
(David B. Wexler ed., 1990).
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believes it is necessary, or how to establish improved communication
between them to prevent future disagreements from occurring.
In an attempt to find an alternative means of resolving treatment
disputes that arise in the voluntary community treatment setting, many
scholars and practitioners have begun to explore the use of mediation.
6
Unlike discharge or involuntary commitment,7 mediation allows for
discussion of the root of the consumer's behavior and his or her reasons for
refusing a prescribed treatment.8 Rather than enforcing a unilateral decision
by the health care provider, mediation encourages discussion between the
provider and consumer on how to best resolve the impasse. 9 Through
mutual brainstorming, each party will come to better understand the other's
point of view and hopefully reach a resolution that suits both parties' needs.
If these are the benefits of using mediation to resolve disputes between
mental health consumers and providers, then why are most voluntary
community-based programs not utilizing it? This Note will explore the
benefits of integrating mediation into the delivery of community mental
health care while addressing some of the criticisms that have arisen to
create barriers to its use. Part II will begin with an overview of the
6 See, e.g., Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lanyering in the Civil Commitment
Context: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Solution to the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 120 (1995); Jeanne A. Clement & Andrew I. Schwebel,
Mediation: An Intervention to Facilitate the Empowerment of Mental Health Consumers,
in MEDIATION AND CoNFLcT RESOLUTION IN SOCIAL WORK AND THE HUMAN SERvicEs
195 (Edward Kruk ed., 1997); Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About
Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRlM. &
Civ. CoNFnINMNT 265 (1994); Noel Mazade et al., Mediation as a New Technique for
Resolving Disputes in the Mental Health System, 21 ADMIN. & POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH
431 (1994).
7 For a brief overview of the failings of the civil commitment process generally,
and Massachusetts's civil commitment laws specifically, see Haycock et al., supra note
6, at 267-269.
8 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 199; Haycock et al., supra note 6, at
281-282; Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 437.
9 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 432-435. Power imbalances are a particular
concern in mediations between mental health consumers and providers. This is because
traditional mental health treatment has been delivered in a paternalistic fashion. Often,
consumers believe they are powerless in making decisions regarding their own care.
This idea has been reinforced through the civil commitment process and ability of
community programs to control discharge policies. For this reason, mediators must be
particularly sensitive to the role each party plays and must encourage participation by
the consumer. See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 199; Haycock et al., supra
note 6, at 283; Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 434-435.
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treatment problems inherent in a voluntary community-based system of
mental health care. Part I will discuss current approaches available to
community-based programs to resolve the disputes that arise when
consumers refuse prescribed treatment. Part IV will then examine the
benefits of using mediation as an alternative means of resolving these
disputes. Part V will touch upon some concerns regarding the limits of
mediation in this context, both real and imagined. Part VI will offer some
suggestions for adapting the mediation process to the community mental
health context. This Note argues that, despite some limits on consumer
participation, mediation should be utilized by voluntary community-based
mental health care programs to resolve treatment disputes with consumers.
II. COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL HEALTH CARE
Beginning in the 1960s, treatment of those with mental disabilities10
began to shift away from large state institutions to smaller, community-
based programs." The following two factors were primarily responsible for
this transition: the civil rights movement, which invited debate and
commentary on the rights of traditionally under-represented persons,
including those with mental disabilities, 12 and the advent of psychotropic
10 Congress, while not specifically defining what mental illnesses constitute a
mental disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, has
included "mental impairment[s] that substantially limit[] one or more of the major life
activities of that individual" within the parameters of that Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)
(1994). The courts, however, have interpreted this to "include manic-depressive
disorder, schizophrenia, personality disorder, anxiety disorder, alcoholism, post
traumatic stress disorder, depression, and unspecified psychiatric problems." Janet
Lowder Hamilton, New Protections for Persons with Mental Illnesses in the Workplace
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 63, 75-76
(1990).
11 In 1960, more than 2,000,000 mentally disabled adults resided in state
psychiatric institutions. By 1980, the number had decreased to 1,144,785. See John
Monahan et al., Coercion to Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for
Assertive Treatment in the Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY
TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 3, at 13, 15
(citing M. ROSENSTEIN ET AL., LEGAL STATUS OF ADMISSIONS TO THREE INPATIENT
PSYCHIATRIC SETTINGS, MENTAL HEALTH STATISTICAL NOTE NUMBER 178 (1986)).
12 See Virginia Aldigd Hiday, Outpatient Commitment: Official Coercion in the
Community, in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW
FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 3, at 29, 29.
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medications, which effectively controlled many of the symptoms of
debilitating mental illnesses. 13
The civil rights movement's focus on the rights of those historically
disenfranchised and neglected by society helped to generate interest in the
plight of mentally disabled individuals who, up until that time, were largely
committed to state institutions out of society's fear and ignorance. 14
Patients, family members, and nonprofit organizations dedicated to helping
mentally disabled individuals began initiating lawsuits challenging the
appropriateness of the placement and the adequacy of the care provided by
these institutions. 15 These cases, heard by both federal and state courts,
determined that the Constitution required states to use the least restrictive
means available to treat mentally disabled individuals. 16
One of the more influential cases in the movement for
deinstitutionalization of mentally disabled individuals was the United States
13 See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 218-227 (discussing the use and
effect of the development of psychotropic medication on individuals with mental
illnesses and institutional roles). Perlin further notes the following "five separate
forces" leading to the deinstitutionalization of mentally disabled adults: (1) recognition
of state hospital deficiencies, (2) experimentation with community treatment, (3)
increased federal funding available for the treatment of individuals with mental
disabilities, (4) development of anti-psychotic drugs, and (5) the "due process
revolution" in mental health law. 2 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 7.02, at 560-564.
14 See JAMEs A. HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORDERED INSANITY: INTERPRETIVE PRACTICE
AND INVOLUNTARY CoMMrrmENT 19-24 (1993); ROBERT D. MILLER, INVOLUNTARY
CviL CoMN~rrmENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL IN Tim POST-REFoR ERA at xiii (1987).
15 For a concise introduction to the role of the courts in the deinstitutionalization of
mentally disabled individuals, see JOHN PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIER
87-92 (5th ed. 1995). For a more in-depth analysis of the right of mentally disabled
individuals to refuse medical treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, see Douglas S. Stransky, Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Medical
Treatment: Resolving Disputes from a Due Process Perspective, 50 U. Mlun L. REv.
413 (1996).
16 See Hiday, supra note 12, at 29 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960);
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dixon v. Wineberger, 405 F.
Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971)). But see Society for Goodwill
to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1247 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that
mentally retarded adults have no constitutional right to be in the community because
there is no constitutional deprivation associated with being institutionalized); Doe v.
Public Health Trust, 696 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that minors
voluntarily committed to institutions by their parents do not have a right to treatment in
the least restrictive means).
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Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson.17 In that case, the
Court held that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without more a
nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by
himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or
friends." 18 Additionally, the Court noted that "a finding of 'mental illness'
alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up against his will and
keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement." 19 As a result,
directors of state institutions were forced to justify the confinement of
mentally disabled individuals beyond a simple diagnosis of mental illness or
retardation. More importantly, mentally disabled individuals would now
have to be provided with treatment programs that included more than the
bare essentials of food, clothing, and shelter. Such treatment requires
significant funding, something many of these state institutions did not
have.20 As a result, many states began to seek alternate housing and
treatment options for their mentally disabled citizens.21
While the courts resisted mandatory deinstitutionalization as a broad
policy, several required specific institutions to close for quality of care
reasons and obligated those institutions to find more suitable community
treatment for their former residents. 22 Some states, such as New York,
17 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The respondent Donaldson was involuntarily committed to
a Florida psychiatric hospital for almost 15 years. He brought this action against the
hospital's superintendent alleging that the hospital had deprived him of his constitutional
right to liberty after repeatedly denying requests that he be released. His complaint
alleged, and the record substantiated, that "he was dangerous to no one, that he was not
mentally ill, and that, at any rate, the hospital was not providing treatment for his
supposed illness." Id. at 565. Respondent was initially committed by his father, who
complained that his son was suffering from delusions. The state diagnosed him as a
paranoid schizophrenic and committed him for "care, maintenance, and treatment"
pursuant to a Florida statute. Id. at 565-566.
18 Id. at 576.
19 Id. at 575.
20 See JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE
FuTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 166 (1992)
(citing Statistical Research Branch, Division of Applied & Serv. Research, National
Inst. of Health, Unpublished Estimates (Aug. 1991) (noting that more than $8 billion
were spent on state hospitals in 1988 alone)).
21 See id. ("[C]ommunity facilities... are far less expensive than
hospitals.... Residential alternatives available on a continuous basis make sense
financially and clinically for the vast majority of chronically mentally ill people who
need a caring and less stressful environment.").
22 For an example of one of the most highly litigated of such cases, see Halderman
v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified 612
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enacted statutes calling for the creation of community-treatment programs
to be funded by state resources generated by the closing of its larger
psychiatric institutions.23 Such legislative responses, however, are the
exception rather than the rule.24
A second and arguably more influential factor leading to the shift in
treatment of those with mental disabilities away from large state institutions
to smaller, community-based programs was the discovery and widespread
availability of psychotropic medications.25 These medications significantly
reduce or eliminate "hallucinations, lower[] recidivism rates, [allow for]
longer intervals between psychotic relapses,... [and] reduc[e] [the]
average hospital stay." 26 Now able to control the outward manifestations of
their illnesses, mentally disabled adults were able to participate more fully
in the community and no longer required the care given by larger state
institutions.
As a result of increased attention to the rights of individuals with
mental disabilities and the advent and availability of psychotropic
medications, confinement of mentally disabled persons in large state
institutions fell into disfavor and community-based mental health treatment
programs flourished.27 Within a few short years, community-based
programs gained primary responsibility for the care, treatment, and training
of mentally disabled individuals. More comprehensive in nature than the
institutions they replaced, community-based programs seek to treat the
individual's illnesses or learning disabilities with medication and training
while also engaging the individual in activities designed to facilitate
independent community living. Such activities include workplace
orientation and job-related skill training, basic household and personal care
skill training, and social and communication skill training. 28
The most striking difference in the methods of treatment employed by
these programs as compared with large state institutions, however, is their
F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), aff'd prior judgment, 673 F.2d 647
(3d Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
23 See PARRY, supra note 15, at 91-92 (citing S. 6214 (1993); A. 8920 (1993)).
24 See id. at 90-91; cf LAFoND & DuRHAM, supra note 20, at 118 (finding a
"modest but discernible trend toward broadened civil commitment laws" during the
latter half of the 1970s).
25 See 2 PEnuN, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 219; WIMCK, supra note 2, at 61-85.
26 2 PFRLN, supra note 2, § 5.02, at 219-220.
27 See 2 id., § 5.02, at 219; 2 id., § 7.02, at 560-564.
28 See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 3, at 67-68.
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voluntary nature. 29 While voluntary treatment has been shown to have
positive therapeutic effects for consumers, it can create significant
compliance issues. One of the most frequently encountered problems is a
mentally disabled individual's refusal to comply with program medication
and medical treatment plans. 30 The individual's need for medical therapy to
control the symptoms of mental illness is thus often in tension with the
individual's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.31 As a result,
many community-based mental health treatment programs are left with few
choices in how to deal with conflicts between program staff and program
participants when the participants refuse to comply with medical treatment
plans.
HIL. CURRENT APPROACHES TO RESOLVING DISPUTES BETWEEN
MENTAL HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS IN THE
COMMUNITY CONTEXT
To date, voluntary community-based mental health treatment programs
have few options to resolve the differences that arise between program staff
and participating consumers when the consumers refuse medical treatment.
Two fundamentally different approaches to these disputes exist. The first
approach focuses on the mentally disabled individual's constitutional right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment. The second approach focuses on the
individual's best medical interests, regardless of what the individual
desires. Applied to any one individual's case, the two approaches often
argue conflicting ways of dealing with the individual's refusal of medical
treatment. 32
29 While many states employ a system of involuntary community-based mental
health treatment programs as a step between involuntary institutionalization and
voluntary community treatment, such treatment is outside the scope of this Note. For a
discussion of involuntary community-based treatment, see LAFOND & DURHAM, supra
note 20, at 121-122. See also Hiday, supra note 12.
30 See 2 PERLN, supra note 2, § 5.01, at 217. For a concise overview of a
mentally disabled individual's right to refuse antipsychotic medication, see COMMISSION
ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, AMERIcAN BAR Ass'N, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION (1986) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY
DISABLED].
31 See discussion infra Part III.
32 See generally Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 432-433.
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The rights-based approach places primary emphasis on a mentally
disabled individual's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.33
Those espousing this view therefore believe that it is their obligation to
abide by the consumer's choice to refuse a particular medication or
treatment, regardless of the effect it may have on the consumer's health. 34
For this reason, some scholars have criticized advocates of a rights-based
approach for encouraging mentally disabled adults to "die with their rights
on." 35 However, most agree that a recognition and focus on a mentally
disabled individual's constitutional rights is an integral part of resolving any
dispute that may arise during the course of treatment in a community-based
program.
In contrast to a rights-based approach, the best interest approach places
primary emphasis on the consumer's medical treatment needs.36 Advocates
of this approach believe that it is their obligation to see that the consumer's
medical needs are met and are willing to deny the consumer their
constitutional right to refuse the treatment if it is in their best interest. 37 The
best interest approach is often deferred to by the courts, particularly in the
process of involuntary commitment.38 Consumers' lawyers often appear
willing to defer to the judgment of medical experts, even when contrary to
33 For a discussion of this right, see COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED,
supra note 30.
34 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 431-432.
35 See id. at 432 (citing D.A. Treffert, Dying with Their Rights on, AM. J.
PsYcHIATRY 130, 259 (1973)).
36 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 432.
37 See LAFOND & DURHAM, supra note 20, at 117. LaFond and Durham note:
Many court decisions are... limiting the rights of patients to refuse drugs and
other therapies, reasoning that the law should not impede hospital staff who are
trying to bring about the very aim of coercive hospitalization-treatment of people
who need it. Measures to increase patient autonomy are increasingly taking a back
seat to more pragmatic concerns.
Id.
38 See id. at 167-168; Mary L. Durham & John Q. LaFond, A Search for the
Missing Premise of Involuntary Therapeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the
Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERS L. Rlv. 303, 309 (1988) (discussing the recent trend in the
states toward involuntary commitment of mentally ill individuals and the legal
justifications for this trend); Charles D.H. Parry et al., A Comparison of Commitment
and Recommitment Hearings: Legal and Policy Implications, 15 INT'L J. L. &
PsYcmATRY 25, 25 (1992) (discussing the ineffectiveness of the current civil
commitment system which allows mentally ill individuals to be committed without the
appropriate legal checks).
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their clients' stated positions.39 This is particularly troublesome given
attorneys' general ignorance of medical science and methods of diagnosing
and treating individuals with mental illnesses.40 As a result, courts often
find in favor of the party advocating treatment and commit the mentally
disabled individual to involuntary care over the individual's objections.
Returning to the example in Part I, one may see why neither of the
above approaches can completely or satisfactorily resolve disputes between
mental health care consumers and providers in the voluntary treatment
setting. If Harmony House staff assume a rights-based approach to
resolving the dispute, they will respect Nora's decision to discontinue
taking Thorazine as an exercise of her constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment. While it is important that the staff acknowledge her
constitutional rights, such recognition will leave them with few options for
resolving the dispute. Harmony House staff may decide to continue to work
with Nora, searching for alternate means of controlling the symptoms of
her illness. This will be difficult, however, given the fact that Nora must
continue to function in this communal setting. Her mood swings and
inability to control her anger will doubtless cause a good deal of friction
between Nora and her housemates. As a result, it is more likely that
Harmony House will decide that Nora's refusal to comply with the
program's recommendations warrants discharge from the program. Nora
will thus be compelled to find alternative housing and assistance with daily
living tasks. If she has family or friends in the community, this may be
possible. However, for most individuals like Nora, discharge from a
program like Harmony House will result in their homelessness or
hospitalization if their symptoms exacerbate.
On the other hand, if Harmony House staff choose a best-interest
approach to resolving the dispute, they may decide that Nora's well-being
demands that she be forced to continue taking Thorazine despite her refusal
39 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 272-274 (noting the failures of the current
civil commitment process to promote effective advocacy for patients facing involuntary
hospitalization); Virginia Aldig6 Hiday, The Attorney's Role in Involuntary Civil
Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1982) (summarizing surveys of attorneys'
performance in the representation of mentally ill clients, in which observers described
them as "reticent, ineffective, ill-prepared, mostly silent, lacking interest, rarely
extending any effort, giving only perfunctory representation, doing little to obtain a
client's release, and seldom challenging adverse statements by witnesses or adverse
psychiatric testimony").
40 See Hiday, supra note 39, at 1030 (noting that attorneys' "lack of medical
expertise" encourages them to "rely on psychiatric reports that recommend involuntary
hospitalization").
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to do so. Thus, the staff may attempt to coerce Nora to comply by taking
away program benefits. 41 For example, Harmony House may inform Nora
that they will no longer provide free transportation to activities that she
enjoys, like shopping trips at the local mall. Staff may place additional
pressure on Nora to comply by constantly cajoling her to take her
medicine. If they are unable to make Nora take her medication after all of
the above methods are exhausted, Harmony House staff may have to have
Nora involuntarily committed to a state institution.
Unfortunately, neither a rights-based nor best-interest approach gets at
the heart of the disagreement between Nora and Harmony House staff. This
is because neither approach seeks to address the reasons behind Nora's
refusal to take Thorazine. More importantly, neither looks to how Nora
feels about the situation or gives her any power or control over its
resolution. The following Part will examine mediation as an alternative
method of resolving this dispute that both empowers the consumer and
provides for valuable communication and exchange between the parties to
the dispute in order to come to a meaningful resolution.
IV. MEDIATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF RESOLVING DISPUTES
BETWEEN MENTAL HEALTH CONSUMERS AND PROVIDERS IN THE
COMMUNITY TREATMENT SETTING
Because of the flaws inherent to both a rights-based and best-interest
approach to resolving mental health disputes in the community treatment
setting, legal and social science scholars have begun to explore alternative
methods. Many have turned to the idea of mediation as a valid and useful
tool.42
Mediation is the process in which a neutral third person assists the
parties in resolving their dispute.43 The neutral person, or mediator, does
not act as a fact-finder or adjudicate the dispute as would a judge or
arbitrator.44 Rather, the mediator's role is to facilitate the communication
between the parties and to encourage creative problem-solving so that they
41 See Diamond, supra note 3, at 55-58.
42 See sources cited supra note 6.
43 For a concise introduction to the process of mediation, see 1 NANCY H. RoGERS
& CRAIG A. McEwEN, MEDIATION: LAW, PoLicY & PRACTICE §§ 1:01-1:04 (2d ed.
1994 & Supp. 1997).
44 See Abisch, supra note 6, at 134 (citing Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of
Mediation, 33 ARiz. L. REv. 467, 471 (1991)).
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may arrive at some mutually acceptable agreement. 45 The process is
characterized by joint sessions, in which all parties participate, and
individual caucuses, in which the mediator speaks with each party
separately. 46 Although the mediator establishes ground rules47 for the
mediation and helps guide the process by framing the issues in dispute, the
parties themselves are largely responsible for directing the process and
outcome of mediation. 48
Many advocates of expanded mediation use argue that party
participation is the most valuable aspect of mediation as it allows the parties
an opportunity to develop their problem-solving49 and communication 50
skills, which will in turn enable them to better resolve future disputes
between the parties. This is especially important for parties to mental health
treatment disputes who will likely have a continuing relationship. 51
Moreover, supporters of mediation argue that because the parties play such
45 See 1 ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 43, at § 1:02; Haycock et al., supra note
6, at 280 (citing H. Jay Folberg, Divorce Mediation-A Workable Alternative, in
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DIsPuTE RESOLUrION 12, 16 (Howard Davidson et al.
eds., 1982)).
46 See 1 ROGERS & McEwEN, supra note 43, at § 3:02. Researchers on the use and
application of traditional mediation processes to mental health disputes note, however,
that caucusing may be ill-advised "if the mental health consumer comes to believe that
there is collusion between the mediator and the other party, or the consumer is not able
to tolerate being alone while the other party is caucusing." Clement & Schwebel, supra
note 6, at 204.
47 Clement and Schwebel stress the importance of explaining the process of
mediation to the mental health consumer in a way that the consumer will understand.
This includes ensuring that:
[Clients have a clear picture of the overall goals of mediation, the role of the
mediator, and the nature of the interventions used.... Fully orienting mental
health consumers to the mediation process may require a unique blend of
approaches, an expanded time frame, and frequent repetition of the material
covered.
Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 202.
48 See id; see also Abisch, supra note 6, at 134 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 44,
at 471, 476-477).
49 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 199.
50 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 281.
51 See id. (citing Marilyn Park et al., Developing a Legal Services Program Policy
on Alternative Dispute Resolution: Important Considerations for Older Clients and
Clients with Disabilities, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 635, 636 (1992)); Mazade et al.,
supra note 6, at 435.
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a significant role in shaping their agreement, they are more likely to be
satisfied with it and comply with its terms. 52
Advocates of the integration of mediation into the delivery of
community-based mental health treatment focus primarily on its consumer-
centered approach and its flexibility.53 In contrast to the rights-based and
best-interest approaches to resolving voluntary treatment disputes,
mediation allows for an examination of the consumer's feelings underlying
the dispute.54 This is particularly important in the mental health care
context, where consumers often feel that their feelings are ignored in favor
of the opinions of doctors and mental health advocates. 55 Additionally,
mediation allows for creative problem-solving and the establishment of
agreements that are unique to the parties.56 This flexibility is not
characteristic of more traditional legal approaches 57 and is particularly
desirable in the resolution of mental health disputes, where the individuals
may not be able to abide by more rigid, court-ordered requirements. 58
Through mediation, the parties may arrive at an agreement that is tailor-
made to accommodate the needs of the consumer while taking into account
the resources of the community provider.
52 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 281 (citing Craig A. McEwen & Richard J.
Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV.
237, 257, 260-264 (1981); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediating and
Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 504-510
(1984)); Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 441 (citing S. Eisenthal et al., Adherence and
the Negotiated Approach to Patienthood, 36 ARcHiVEs GEN. PsYcIATRY 393-398
(1979)).
53 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 280; Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 435;
Andrew I. Schwebel & Jeanne A. Clement, Mediation as a Mental Health Service:
Consumer's and Family Members' Perceptions, 20 PSYCHMATRIC REH L4 ATION J.,
Summer 1996, at 55, 56.
54 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 198-199.
55 See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 17 (1991). Indeed, research
suggests that getting mental health consumers to participate in mediation may be a
mediator's greatest challenge. This is because most individuals having long-term
involvement with mental health care and legal and clinical advocates are used to being
spoken for instead of asserting their interests and opinions themselves. See Clement &
Schwebel, supra note 6, at 203; Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 434-435.
56 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 280; Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 435.
57 This is particularly true of the civil commitment process, where the only options
are to commit or not. See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 280.
58 See generally Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6.
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In Nora's situation, for example, mediation might be employed to
resolve the dispute regarding her treatment. The mediator's role would be
to facilitate communication between Nora and Harmony House staff in
order to uncover the issues underlying her refusal to take her prescribed
medication. The mediator would begin by explaining the mediation process
in a way that is meaningful to both Nora and the staff.59 The mediator
would then encourage Nora to explore why she dislikes taking Thorazine.
For the first time, staff may hear that Nora is afraid that she will be fired
from her job at the local sandwich shop as a result of her constant
catnapping, which she attributes to her medication. During this discussion,
Nora might also inform staff that the sandwich shop has emphasized the
need for a tidy and well-groomed appearance. This, she explains, is why
she rises so early each morning to prepare for work.
The mediator might then ask Harmony House staff to discuss why they
believe Thorazine is the appropriate medication for Nora. Staff will relate
instances of aggressive and disruptive behavior by Nora, particularly
toward her roommate, Betty. Because Betty dislikes having the light on in
their room so early in the morning and is upset by the noise created by
Nora's grooming, Betty and Nora frequently engaged in loud shouting
matches. The staff attributed these outbursts to Nora's mental illness and
relayed them to the program physician. As a result, the physician has
recently increased Nora's Thorazine dosage. Nora's recent catnapping at
the sandwich shop is one apparent side effect.
Upon further discussion, Harmony House staff will reassess whether or
not medication is the best answer to Nora's problems. They may now
understand that Nora's outbursts may be attributable to her fear of losing
her job, rather than her illness. However, if they still believe that taking
Thorazine will help Nora, they will have the opportunity to explain this to
her. Moreover, because Nora has had the opportunity to talk out her
concerns, she may be more willing to listen to Harmony House staff. Once
Nora feels heard and understood, she may be more amenable to discussing
her medication.
The mediator might then excuse program staff and spend some time
talking with Nora individually. 60 During this session, the mediator will
encourage Nora to brainstorm about some possible solutions to the
59 See discussion supra note 47. Clement and Schwebel suggest that the mediator
use visual aids where possible and use short, simple, concrete ideas when explaining the
process. See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 202-204; Schwebel & Clement,
supra note 53, at 58.
60 But see LAFOND & DuRHAM, supra note 20.
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problem. Would she consider exchanging roommates with another resident?
Is there some place or someone that she could talk to when she felt her
anger rising in order to prevent explosive outbursts? Could she adjust her
work schedule so that she would have adequate time to get ready in the
morning and thus avoid the cause of the disruption? Lastly, the mediator
might prompt Nora to consider the staff's position regarding continued
medication. Might she consider resuming the medication at the previously
lower dose, with adjustments to follow if needed once her home and work
schedules have been adjusted to compensate for her difficulties?
Likewise, the mediator would meet separately with the staff. Is it
possible to switch Nora and another resident so that she and Betty no longer
have to share a room? Is there some place Nora can go or someone
available to Nora who can listen to her and help her to vent her emotions
before they develop into an explosive episode? With these adjustments at
home, and perhaps a few at work, might it be appropriate to lower Nora's
dose of medication or change it entirely so that she will be better able to
perform at work?
Bringing Nora and the staff back together for a joint session, the
mediator would then explore the options discussed during the caucuses with
Nora and Harmony House staff. The mediator will attempt to find a middle
ground that is acceptable to both parties. Once this is established, the
mediator will draft an agreement that incorporates the compromise reached.
The agreement must be drafted in such a way that Nora will comprehend it.
This problem might be overcome by some picture cards designed to remind
Nora of the agreement and to prompt her to talk with staff or relax in her
special place when she feels the need to release anger. Alternatively, the
mediator might make an audio or video recording of the agreement to
remind Nora of the settlement and her responsibilities under it. 61
In the end, such a process will likely leave Nora feeling less angry, less
frustrated, and less anxious about both her home and work situations. The
staff, too, will be more sympathetic to the stresses in Nora's daily life.
Having brought both parties to a new understanding of the conflict and the
reasons behind it, mediation will strengthen rather than harm their
relationship.
Improved communication, party-directed settlement, and the
opportunity for consumer expression and empowerment through
participation in the decisionmaking process make mediation a very
61 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 204; Schwebel & Clement, supra
note 53, at 58.
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attractive alternative to the current approaches available to resolving
disputes that arise in the community treatment context.
V. BARRIERS TO EFFECTIVE MEDIATION OF DIsPuTES IN THE
COMMUNITY TREATMENT CONTEXT: THE QUEsTION OF COMPETENCY
Despite its apparent benefits, mediation has yet to be integrated into the
community mental health care delivery system. 62 This is primarily due to
the belief that mentally disabled individuals are incompetent to negotiate
effectively or to abide by mediated agreements. 63 However, recent studies
indicate that mentally disabled adults can participate in their own treatment
decisions and welcome the opportunity to do so. 64 Moreover, they show
that consumers who participate in mediation are more likely to abide by the
agreements reached than with treatment decisions made unilaterally by the
program or legal system.65 This Part will address the conventional wisdom
regarding mental disabilities and competency as well as research suggesting
that just the opposite may be true.
The legal community has long wrestled with the question of how much
input and autonomy mentally disabled individuals should be given in
representing their interests. 66  Conventional wisdom suggests that
individuals who are mentally retarded or who suffer from mental illnesses
are unable to make decisions, particularly with regard to their medical
treatment, that are both well reasoned and in their best interest. 67 As a
result, these individuals have been shut out of the decisionmaking process.
When able, doctors, therapists, social workers, and others attempt to exert
influence over mentally disabled individuals in order to assure that their
best interests are looked after. Where this is not possible, or where the
individual refuses to comply, the legal system often assumes the role of
62 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 434, 436, 441.
63 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 284; Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 436-
437; Schwebel & Clement, supra note 53, at 55-56.
64 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 437; Schwebel & Clement, supra note 53, at
57.
65 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
66 For a discussion of competency and mental health law, see Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIANH L. REv.
625 (1993) (addressing the presumption that mentally disabled individuals are
incompetent to make treatment decisions as played out in the civil commitment process
and the legal system's reliance on expert medical testimony).
67 See id. at 627-630; Schwebel & Clement, supra note 53, at 55.
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care-giver and guardian. Unfortunately, research shows that such arguably
altruistic actions may actually undermine, rather than contribute to, a
patient's therapy. 68
The problems inherent in both our medical and legal communities
regarding the treatment of mentally disabled individuals is the subject of
much discussion among therapeutic jurisprudence scholars. 69 They note
that societal prejudices towards mentally disabled adults have prevented the
development of a legal system that values their abilities and contributions. 70
68 Winick notes that "[tireating patients as incompetent to make ... treatment
decisions for themselves... actually may promote psychological dysfunction.
Exercising self-determination is a basic human need. Studies show that allowing
individuals to make decisions for themselves is intrinsically motivating." Winick, supra
note 5, at 1162.
69 "Therapeutic jurisprudence" is "the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic
agent." David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 220, 220 (1995). For a complete discussion of therapeutic
jurisprudence and its arguments for the empowerment and treatment of mentally
disabled adults through the law, see DAvID B. WExLE, THERAPEuTIc JuRisPRUDENCE:
THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); ESSAYS IN TmAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); Janet B. Abisch, supra note 6, at 120
(arguing that mediation techniques should be incorporated in the current civil
commitment process to empower mentally disabled clients and allow for meaningful
representation by counsel); Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373
(1992) (arguing that societal prejudices towards mentally disabled individuals have
shaped our law to limit their rights and impair their participation); Perlin, supra note 66
(discussing the use of competency to limit the rights of mentally disabled adults);
Winick, supra note 5.
70 In his article, On "Sanism," Michael Perlin describes the following ten most
common myths held applicable to individuals with mental illnesses: (1) they are
"different" from others in that they are unable to control their moral, emotional, and
sexual selves; (2) they are dangerous at worst, simple-minded at best, and thus the
state's institutionalization of them is justified under its police or parens patriae power;
(3) they are incompetent to make well-informed decisions regarding their own well-
being; (4) those individuals who refuse to take antipsychotic medication are likely to
become violent and therefore should be institutionalized; (5) they are easily identifiable;
(6) labeling individuals, who are mentally ill as suffering from particular maladies is
acceptable, and in fact proper; (7) they should not be integrated into the community due
to their economic and social instability; (8) those individuals suffering from mental
illnesses who are convicted criminals are incapable of reform and are thus the most
dangerous kind of criminals-yet they too often are allowed to plead insanity and
therefore "beat the rap"; (9) they are the way they are because they lack the ability to
control themselves, or simply choose not to; and (10) they are best left in institutions,
where neither they nor society will be harmed. See Perlin, supra note 69, at 393-397;
see also ROBERT M. LEvY & LEONARD S. RuBENsTmN, THE RIGHTs OF PEOPLE WITH
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As a result, mentally disabled individuals have been left out of the
decisionmaking processes that most affect them. This includes civil
commitment hearings, medication reviews, and other issues in treatment
planning.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that mentally disabled individuals
are unable to make reasoned decisions regarding their medical treatment,
recent studies suggest that the opposite is true. 71 Relying on data and
feedback generated by five consumer focus groups,72 researchers Andrew
Schwebel and Jeanne Clement found that consumers favored the use of
mediation to resolve mental health care disputes. 73 Furthermore, most
stated that they believed they would be able to comply with mediated
agreements so long as their illnesses remained asymptomatic. 74 Other
researchers, such as Blanch and Parrish, found that consumers believed
they could participate in mediation "even when holding psychotic beliefs"
or when hospitalized as a result of acute illness. 75
MENTAL DisAmLrrms 1-2 (1996) (describing early Supreme Court case law and state
statutory law finding mentally retarded adults to be a "blight on mankind" and "a
danger to the race"). Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous United States Supreme
Court in Buck v. Bell, commented that "[i]t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute the degenerate offspring for crime, or let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind
[through compulsory sterilization] .... Three generations of imbeciles are enough."
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
71 See Schwebel & Clement, supra note 53, at 56.
72 Fifty consumers of differing ages, gender, ethnicity, social class, and level of
disability participated in ten meetings which were held in urban, suburban, and rural
areas. Each had been hospitalized at least once in the recent past. Consumers were
introduced to mediation through a brief film, after which they were encouraged to
participate in a two hour discussion regarding the use of mediation to help them in
resolving disputes with mental health care providers over issues of treatment. See id.
73 See id. at 55-57.
74 See id. at 57.
75 Id. at 56 (citing Andrea K. Blanch and Jacqueline Parrish, Reports of Three
Roundtable Discussions on Involuntary Interventions, in PsYcmAnuc REHAiLITATION
AND COMMUNrrY SUPPORT MONOGRAPH SERms 1 (1994)); see also Mazade et al., supra
note 6, at 437 (citing Andrea Blanch et al., Consumers, Practitioners, and Psychiatrists
Share Insights About Recovery and Coping, 13 DIsABILrY STUD. Q. 17-20 (1993)
("[D]ata ... suggest[s] that even persons in a mental health crisis are often willing and
capable of talking with others about the precipitating events that have led to the crisis,
and about potential resolution of their problems.")).
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Most scholars agree, however, that there are limits to consumer
participation in mediation. 76 Some suggest that mediation should not be
used to resolve conflicts where competency of the consumer is the central
issue77 or where the individual is unable to effectively communicate wants
and needs. 78 Many others want to preclude participation to consumers
experiencing full blown psychotic episodes. However, making participation
in mediation contingent upon the consumer's psychiatric state begs the
question of who is to make that determination. 79 A mediation system that
hinges on a finding of competency by either the mediator or counsel would
appear to have the same problems as the current approaches to resolving
mental health disputes. 80
Unfortunately, there simply is not enough data to date to overcome
societal prejudices, that color our beliefs regarding the competency of
mentally disabled individuals, particularly as it is required to participate in
the legal system. The debate over competency will thus continue to be an
effective barrier to the integration of mediation into the mental health
system until further research can be completed.
VI. ADAPTING MEDIATION TO SUIT THE MENTAL HEALTH CONTEXT
Those willing to accept that mentally disabled adults are competent to
participate meaningfully in the mediation process do, however, advocate
for systematic changes to accommodate for the special needs of mental
health care consumers.81 This includes establishing specific mediator
qualifications to limit the practice of mediation to mental health
professionals or those educated in topics of mental health. Advocates also
76 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 441.
77 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 284 (citing AMERCAN BAR ASS'N,
ALTERNATivE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN ADR PRIMER (3d ed. 1989)). This does not
accord with the authors' view, which is that competency is almost always the issue in
disputes between mental health care consumers and providers. See id.
78 See Mazade et al., supra note 6, at 441.
79 See Abisch, supra note 6, at 136 (arguing that lawyers trained in mental health
law and mediation techniques might be the best decisionmakers); Haycock et al., supra
note 6, at 285 (arguing that this power should be invested in the mediator).
80 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 284-285. The authors note that "to achieve
its goals and to represent an alternative approach to involuntary civil commitment,
mediation cannot simply be for the already compliant patient, but must also involve
some of those who have weak relationships with mental health providers or are
otherwise somewhat treatment resistant. " Id.
81 See, e.g., Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 202-204.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
address issues of appropriate settings in which to hold mediations involving
mental health consumers, whether or not to limit the use of caucuses, and
the need to create visual or audio aids to assist the consumer in an
understanding of the process and the agreement. Finally, those seeking to
integrate mediation into the current system of mental health delivery must
determine whether the parties' counsel should attend the mediation.82
A. Who Should Mediate?
Although scholars disagree as to whether mediator qualifications are a
necessary means of ensuring quality mediation, 83 most recognize that in
specific areas of conflict additional training or education may be needed.84
82 For a brief overview of this debate, see Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 284-
287.
83 Mediator qualifications and training are areas of considerable debate among legal
scholars. See W. Lee Dobbins, The Debate over Mediator Qualifications: Can They
Satisfy the Growing Need to Measure Competence Without Barring Entry into the
Market?, 7 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 96 (1995); Norma Jeanne Hill,
Qualification Requirements of Mediators, 1998 J. Disp. RESOL. 37, 37. Many argue that
mediators should be required to meet a minimum level of education and training in the
process and techniques of mediation in order to be licensed as a mediator. See Dobbins,
supra, at 96-97; Bobby Marzine Harges, Mediator Qualifications: The Trend Toward
Professionalization, 1997 BYU L. REv. 687, 688. Some, however, maintain that such
requirements unnecessarily limit the number of mediators available to the public and
create a private system of mediation that precludes its use to those who cannot afford it.
See 1 ROGERS & McEWEN, supra note 43, § 2:04 (citing NEw S. WALEs LAW COMM'N,
TRAINING AND ACCREDITATION OF MEDIATORS, REPORT 47 (1991)); id. at § 2:08;
Dobbins, supra, at 97-98. They would not limit mediator licensing to particular
professions, such as lawyers, but rather would simply require some basic training in
mediation techniques. See Dobbins, supra, at 110, 111.
84 This is most often the case with mediation involving the family issues, including
divorce and child custody arrangements. See Dobbins, supra note 83, at 101 ("The
Academy of Family Mediators requires its members to hold a law degree, a master's
degree, or a bachelor's degree in addition to having several years experience.");
Dobbins, supra note 83, at 105 ("In Michigan, an individual cannot become a domestic
relations mediator unless he has been practicing law for five years and has actively
practiced in domestic relations for three of the past five years."); Harges, supra note
83, at 694-699 (providing a table of state qualifications for domestic case mediators).
But see Nichol M. Schoenfield, Note, Turf Battles and Professional Biases: An Analysis
of Mediator Qualifications in Child Custody Disputes, 11 OIIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
469, 486 (1996) (noting that some studies cast a doubt on "whether mediator
qualifications, particularly those requiring educational degrees, make a substantial
contribution to the fairness of the process") (quoting Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in
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This is particularly true in mental health law, where issues of diagnosis,
treatment, and community resources and services are almost always
intertwined with the discussion of the individual's legal rights. For this
reason, most commentators argue that mediators employed in the mental
health context should have a thorough knowledge of mental health law and
related mental health concepts in addition to available community
resources.
85
Some have suggested that mediation teams be employed rather than
individual mediators. 86 Their assumption is that a team would be less likely
to slip into the role of legal advocate for the consumer or, alternatively, a
clinician seeking to advance the best medical interests of the consumer. 87
Whether a team or individual is ultimately employed, however, the
mediator's appearance of fairness and ability to facilitate communication
between the parties without appearing coercive to the consumer is crucial to
successful mediation of mental health disputes. 88
B. Where Should Mediations Be Held and How Should Mediators
Accommodate for Consumers' Special Needs?
Because individuals with mental disabilities are often unable to process
large amounts of information over an extended period of time, advocates of
the use of mediation to resolve disputes between mental health consumers
and providers suggest that mediation be conducted in a setting in which
there are few disturbances 89 and that the mediator allow for frequent breaks
and repetition of information and instructions. 90 Additionally, scholars note
that mediators will have to be more sensitive to how consumers are
the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce
Mediation, 79 MiNN. L. REv. 1317, 1344 (1995)).
85 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 203; Haycock et al., supra note 6, at
286 (arguing that familiarity with mental health issues and the law is the key
requirement).
86 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 286 (citing Russell M. Coombs, Noncourt-
Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child Custody Disputes, 17 FAm. L.Q. 469,
470 (1984)).
87 See id. at 287.
88 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 203, 207.
89 Clement and Schwebel suggest holding mediations in locations other than those
usually used by mental health professionals, such as a church or local library. This way,
both the consumer and the provider are able to feel at ease in a setting that is quiet and
disconnected to the dispute, thus avoiding the possibility for "negative cues." Id. at 206.
90 See id. at 207.
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processing information regarding mediation procedure. 91 They suggest that
mediators use flip charts or other visual and audio aids to stimulate and
engage the consumer during mediation. 92 Likewise, similar cues may be
employed by the mediator to remind the consumer of the agreement
reached so that the consumer may be better able to comply with its
provisions. 93
C. Should the Parties' Counsel Attend the Mediation?
As stated above, lawyers and the courts must recognize the consumer's
constitutional right to refuse treatment when engaging in any legal
proceeding. 94 Those who advocate counsel attendance argue that lawyers
are needed to provide a check on the paternalistic influence and pressure
exerted by mental health care providers. 95 They believe that lawyers will be
better able to balance the needs of the consumer with the consumer's legal
rights than would a mediator whose training would prejudice the mediator
toward a clinical approach. 96
However, as previously noted, lawyers are rarely able to strike that
balance. 97 Professional guidelines, moreover, do little toward assisting
91 See Schwebel & Clement, supra note 53, at 58.
92 See Clement & Schwebel, supra note 6, at 204-207; Schwebel & Clement,
supra note 53, at 58.
93 See Schwebel & Clement, supra note 53, at 58.
94 For a discussion of the legal rights of mentally disabled adults, see supra Part III
and accompanying notes.
95 See Abisch, supra note 6, at 133-137 (discussing the role of the lawyer
generally); Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 287 (discussing the role of the lawyer as one
who focuses on the legal aspects of the consumer where the mediator might be less
inclined to do so because of the mediator's mental health orientation).
96 See Abisch, supra note 6, at 133-137; Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 287.
97 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth discussion of
the lawyer's difficult role in representing clients with mental disabilities, see Elliot
Andalman & David L. Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil
Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974); Stanley S.
Herr, Representation of Clients with Mental Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control,
17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 609 (1990); Stanley S. Herr, The Future of
Advocacy for Persons with Mental Disabilities, 39 RUTGERs L. REv. 443 (1987); Hiday,
supra note 39; Steven J. Schwartz et al., Protecting the Rights and Enhancing the
Dignity of People with Mental Disabilities: Standards for Effective Legal Advocacy, 14
RuTGERS L.J. 541 (1983); Paul R. Trembley, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer
Decisionmaking and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515;
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lawyers in this role.98 The complete discretion given lawyers in their
relationship and representation of mentally disabled individuals leaves them
as vulnerable to the influences and professional judgment of clinicians as
are their clients.
Moreover, including lawyers in mental health mediation makes it more
likely that the proceedings will be adversarial rather than cooperative in
Steven J. Goode, Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Processes: A
Theoretical Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1984).
98 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 287. The legal system's ambivalence is
evidenced in the inability of drafters to agree on the lawyer's role in representing clients
with mental disabilities. The most recent statement on this issue can be found in the
American Law Institute's Proposed Final Draft Number One of Restatement of the
Law: The Law Governing Lawyers:
§ 35. Client Under Disability
(1) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority,
physical illness, mental disability, or other cause, the lawyer must, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client
and act in the best interests of the client as stated in Subsection (2).
(2) A lawyer representing a client impaired as described in Subsection (1) and
for whom no guardian or other representative is available to act, must, with respect
to a matter within the scope of the representation, pursue the lawyer's reasonable
view of the client's objectives or interests as the client would define them if able to
make adequately considered decisions on the matter, even if the client expresses no
wishes or gives contrary instructions.
(4) A lawyer representing a client impaired as described in Subsection (1) may
seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action within the scope
of the representation when doing so is practical and will advance the client's
objectives or interests, determined as stated in Subsection (2).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERs § 35 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1996). The comments to § 35 note that:
Clients should not be unnecessarily deprived of their right to control their own
affairs on account of such disabilities. Lawyers, moreover, should be careful not to
construe as proof of disability a client's insistence on a view of the client's welfare
that a lawyer considers unwise or otherwise at variance with the lawyer's own
views.
Id. at § 35 cmt. c. This unfortunately adds little to previous statements of a lawyer's
responsibility in representing mentally disabled clients as embodied in the American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility and American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Abisch, supra note 6, at 138-139.
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nature. 99 Critics of representation during mediation, particularly in the
mental health care context, worry that the adversarial climate will
ultimately do more harm than good to the consumer and the consumer's
treatment. 100
Most importantly, critics of including lawyers note that, if counsel are
present at mediations between mental health consumers and providers,
consumers are less likely to participate. 101 Because mental health
consumers have traditionally been left out of the decisionmaking processes
that most effect them, few would feel empowered to take an active role
with counsel representing them. As one commentator put it, including
counsel in mental health mediation may in fact "defeat the purpose of
mediation, namely to let the parties speak for themselves." 102 Because the
inclusion of counsel threatens to jeopardize the therapeutic effects of
mediation, lawyers should rarely be included in mental health mediation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the conventional wisdom which suggests that mentally disabled
individuals cannot participate meaningfully in mediation to resolve mental
health treatment disputes with community providers, initial research has
proven that mediation is an effective and therapeutic alternative to the
current rights-based and best-interest approaches. Further research and
study regarding the ability of mentally disabled individuals to participate in
mediation is needed in order to better define adaptations to the process and
limits to its use. With increased data and scholarship on the use of
mediation to resolve mental health disputes in the community treatment
setting, the clinical and legal communities might come to value the
99 Cf. Alison Smiley, Professional Codes and Neutral Lauyering: An Emerging
Standard Governing Nonrepresentational Attorney Mediation, 7 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs
213,214-215 (1993).
100 See Abish, supra note 6, at 141.
The adversarial role enables the lawyer to represent a client zealously and defer to
the client's wishes, but it also simply takes the client's decision at face value and
ignores the fact that a client may need to be educated in order to "understand,
deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about the matters affecting [the client's]
own well-being."
Id. (alteration in original) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.14
cmt. (1990)).
101 See Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 287.
102 Id.
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participation of mental health consumers and understand the role they can
play in resolving their own disputes and formulating reasoned treatment
plans.

